# Taming the Computational Complexity of Combinatorial Auctions

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#### **Overview**

#### **1. Problem Statement**

- 2. CASS
- 3. Experimental Results
- 4. Conclusions

# **Combinatorial Auctions**

- # Agents often desire goods more in combination with other goods than separately
  - ☑ Example: two pieces of adjacent property
- Combinatorial Auctions: mechanisms that allow agents to explicitly indicate complementarities
  - △ Multiple goods are auctioned simultaneously
  - △ Bidders place as many bids as they want
  - Each bid may claim any number of goods
- **#** Agents assume less risk than in sequential auctions
  - △ The auctioneer can hope to achieve higher revenues and/or greater social welfare

#### **Problem Statement**

Betermine the winners of a combinatorial auction

- Given a set of bids on bundles of goods, find a subset containing non-conflicting bids that maximizes revenue
- △ This procedure can be used as a building block for more complex combinatorial auction mechanisms

⊠e.g., the Generalized Vickrey Auction mechanism

- Hortunately, even this building block is an NP-complete problem
- Finding optimal allocations remains desirable
   properties like truth revelation may not hold with approximation
   problems up to a certain size will be tractable

### Substitutability

- Sometimes bidders will pay *less* for combinations of goods than the sum of what they would pay for each good individually
   e.g., copies of the same book
- **H** A bidder submits:  $(\$20, \{g\})$ ;  $(\$20, \{h\})$ ;  $(\$30, \{g,h\})$ 
  - $\bigtriangleup$  {g} and {h} would be the winning bids: the bidder would be charged \$40 instead of \$30

**H** Dummy goods:

- The bidder submits: (\$20,  $\{g,d\}$ ), (\$20,  $\{h,d\}$ ), and (\$30,  $\{g,h\}$ ) where d is a new, unique dummy good
- △ The first two bids now name the same good and so will never be allocated together



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## **CASS: Introduction**

- **K** CASS Combinatorial Auction Structured Search
- **CASS** considers fewer partial allocations than a naïve DFS:
  - structure the search space: consider fewer conflicting bids
  - pruning: use context from the search structure to generate close overestimates of total revenue
  - ordering heuristics: capitalize on this structure to speed searching and improve anytime performance
- **#** CASS has low memory demands
  - only stores nodes that are part of current allocation (# goods)
  - △ most memory is used for pruning tables
  - average 10-20 MB used for problems discussed today
- ℜ Originally we proposed two algorithms, now CASS is always faster

## **Naïve Depth-First Search**

**#** bids are tuples: (a binary set of goods, a price)

- % nodes are partial allocations (sums of bids)
- start node: empty set (no goods, \$0)

% transitions between nodes: add one bid to the partial allocation

only add non-conflicting bids (bids whose intersection with the current partial allocation is empty)

**#** terminal node: no non-conflicting bids exist

the terminal node with the highest revenue is the optimal allocation

# CASS Improvement #1: Preprocessing

- 1. Remove dominated bids
  - If there exist bids  $b_k = (p_k, G_k)$  and  $b_l = (p_k, G_l)$  such that  $p_l \ge p_k$ and  $G_l \subseteq G_{k'}$  then remove  $b_k$

☑ Two bids for the same bundle of goods with different prices

- ☑ One bundle is a a strict subset of another and has a higher price
- 2. For each good g, if there is no bid  $b=(x, \{g\})$ , add a dummy bid  $b=(0, \{g\})$ 
  - △ This ensures that the optimal set of bids will name every good, even if some goods are not actually allocated

# CASS Improvement #2: Bins

Structure the search space to reduce the number of infeasible allocations that are considered

△ Partition bids into bins,  $D_{i'}$  containing all bids *b* where good  $i \in G_b$  and for all  $j < i, j \notin G_b$ 

△ Add only one bid from each bin



# CASS Improvement #3: Skipping Bins

℅ When considering bin D<sub>i</sub>, if good j > i is already part of the allocation then do not consider any of the bids in D<sub>j</sub> All the bids in D<sub>j</sub> are guaranteed to conflict with our allocation

**H** In general, instead of considering each bin in turn, skip to  $D_k$  where  $k \notin G(F)$  and  $\forall i < k, I \in G(F)$ 



# CASS Improvement #4: Pruning

- Backtrack when it is impossible to add bids to the current allocation to achieve more revenue than the current best allocation
- **\mathbb{H}** Revenue overestimate function o(g, i, F)
  - An overestimate of the revenue that can be achieved with good g, searching from bin i with current partial allocation Fan admissible heuristic
  - $\square$  precompute lists for all *g*, *i*:

 $\boxtimes$  all bids that contain good g and appear in bin *i* or beyond  $\boxtimes$  sorted in descending order of average price per bid (APPB)

 $rac{1}{2}$  return APPB of the first bid in the list that doesn't conflict with F

**Solution** Backtrack at any point during the search if *revenue*(F) +  $\sum_{g \notin F} o(g, i, F) \leq revenue(best_allocation)$ 

# CASS Improvement #5: Good Ordering Heuristic

**#** Good ordering: what good will be numbered #1, #2...

**#** Goal: reduce branching factor at the top of the tree

- pruning will often occur before bins with a higher branching factor are reached
- **#** Ordering of goods:

Sort goods in ascending order of score,

 $score(g) := \frac{number of \ bids \ containing \ g}{average \ length \ of \ bids \ containing \ g}$ 

 $\bigtriangleup$  more bids  $\rightarrow$  more branching  $\boxdot$  longer bids  $\rightarrow$  shallower search

# CASS Improvement #6: Bid Ordering Heuristic

#### **Finding good allocations quickly:**

- 1. Makes pruning more effective
- 2. Is useful if anytime performance is important
- **Crdering of bids in each bin:** 
  - Sort bids in descending order of average price per good
  - More promising bids will be encountered earlier in the search



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## **Experimental Results:** Data Distributions

Here is little or no real data available, so we drew bids randomly from specific distributions

**#** Binomial: 
$$f_b(n) = \frac{p^n (1-p)^{N-n} N!}{n! (N-n)!}, p = 0.2$$

△ The probability of each good being included in a given bid is independent of which other goods are included



## **Experimental Results: Data Distributions**

 Binomial is fairly easy to analyze, but not very realistic
 Model in a real auction, we expect mostly short bids
 Model in an allocation

**#** Exponential:  $f_e(n) = Ce^{x/p}, p = 5$ 

△ a bid for n+1 goods appears  $e^{-1/p}$  times less often than a bid for n goods.



# **Experimental Results:** Data Distributions

Beruing is done on the basis of price
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 Distribution of prices is also very important
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- **H** Prices of bids for *n* goods is uniformly distributed between [n(1-d), n(1+d)], d = 0.5
  - prices cluster around a "natural" average price per bid, and deviate by a random amount
  - ☐ if prices were completely random, the pruning algorithm would have more of an advantage

## Experimental Results: Running Time (Binomial)

CASS Performance: Runtime vs. Number of Bids



Running time (median over 20 runs, seconds)

# **Experimental Results: Running Time (Exp.)**

CASS Performance: Runtime vs. Number of Bids



# **Experimental Results: Running Time (Exp.)**

CASS Performance: Runtime vs. Number of Bids



## **Experimental Results: Anytime Performance (Exp)**

CASS Percentage Optimality: Elapsed Time vs. Number of Bids



# Sandholm's BidTree Algorithm

**#** Presents results for four different distributions:

Random Distribution:

Select the number of goods, N, in a given bid (uniform random)

 $\square$  Uniquely choose the goods

≥Price: uniform random between [0, 1]

☑ Weighted Random Distribution:

⊠Same as above, but price is [0, N]

Uniform Distribution

⊠All bids have same length (3 goods in this case)

≥ Price: uniform random between [0, 1]

△ Decay Distribution

☑A given bid starts with one random good

 $\boxtimes$  Keep adding random unique goods with probability  $\alpha$ 

≥Price: uniform random between [0, N]

### **Experimental Results: Random Distribution**

CASS vs BidTree Performance: Runtime vs. Number of Bids



Running time (average over 20 runs, seconds)

## Experimental Results: Weighted Random Distribution

CASS vs BidTree Performance: Runtime vs. Number of Bids



Running time (average over 20 runs, seconds)

## **Experimental Results: Uniform Distribution**

CASS vs BidTree Performance: Runtime vs. Number of Bids



Running time (average over 20 runs, seconds)

# **Experimental Results: Decay Distribution**

CASS vs BidTree Performance: Runtime vs. Number of Bids



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#### Conclusions

We have proposed an algorithm to mitigate the computational complexity of combinatorial auctions, which works surprisingly well on simulated data

 determines optimal allocations in a small fraction of the time taken by a naïve DFS approach to solve the same problem
 can find good approximate solutions quickly

#### **Future Work**

Investigate the effects of different bin orderings and orderings of bids within bins

#### **#** Compare to other search techniques

☐ integer programming

- ☐ other combinatorial auction search techniques
- **#** Experiments with real data (FCC auctions?)
- **#** Caching: referenced in our paper, but currently disabled
- Bivisible/identical goods
  - some of our work on CASS is relevant to the new problem; much is not